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Abstract:	  	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  analyse	  discursive	  struggles	  over	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  legal	  and	  illegal	  user	  practices	  in	  the	  internet	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty.	  The	  latter,	  in	  turn,	  is	  examined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  transnational	  copyright	  regime	  characterised	  by	  three	  features:	  	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  universally	  recognized	  single	  authority	  in	  charge	  of	  law-­‐making,	  fragmented	  and	  partially	  contradicting	  forms	  of	  regulation	  of	  global,	  national	  and	  sectoral	  scope,	  and	  considerable	  indeterminacy	  of	  rule	  interpretation	  and	  application	  arising	  from	  the	  variety	  and	  distinctiveness	  of	  local	  usage	  contexts.	  We	  argue	  that	  notions	  of	  legality	  and	  illegality	  are	  used	  strategically	  by	  different	  actors	  to	  resolve	  perceived	  misalignments	  between	  regulation,	  business	  models	  and	  user	  practices.	  	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  legality	  and	  illegality,	  while	  often	  presented	  as	  well-­‐defined	  distinction,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  internet	  user	  practices	  is	  often	  far	  from	  clear-­‐cut	  and	  generally	  accepted.	  In	  fact,	  copyright	  industry,	  intermediaries,	  users	  and	  regulators	  are	  involved	  in	  what	  Black	  (2002)	  refers	  to	  as	  “regulatory	  conversations”.	  Analysing	  these	  regulatory	  conversations	  offers	  a	  revealing	  entry	  point	  to	  study	  how	  under	  conditions	  of	  transnational	  regime	  complexity	  and	  diffusion	  of	  new	  technology	  solutions	  to	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  are	  negotiated	  in	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  social	  contexts. 
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“If	  economic	  losses	  are	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  crime’s	  seriousness,	  and	  if	  current	  estimates	  are	  to	  be	  
believed,	  then	  film	  ‘piracy’	  constitutes	  a	  crime-­‐wave	  nearing	  epidemic	  proportions.”	  (Yar	  2005:	  
667)	  
Since	  the	  1970s,	  the	  regulation	  of	  copyright	  law	  has	  developed	  from	  a	  very	  specialized	  legal	  
field	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  areas	  in	  international	  politics	  (Sell	  and	  Prakadesh	  2004).	  
The	  regulation	  of	  property	  and	  exploitation	  rights	  of	  intangible	  goods	  has	  increasingly	  become	  
an	  issue	  of	  social	  and	  political	  contestation,	  both	  in	  public	  and	  private	  arenas	  (Dobusch	  and	  
Quack	  2012).	  In	  the	  course	  of	  these	  contestations,	  notions	  of	  legality	  and	  illegality	  of	  usage	  
practices	  in	  the	  internet	  are	  both	  subject	  and	  means	  of	  discursive	  struggles	  over	  what	  
constitutes	  socially	  acceptable	  and	  legitimate	  practices	  and	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  
inappropriate	  and	  illegitimate.	  In	  these	  struggles,	  the	  actors	  seem	  to	  assume	  and	  maintain	  that	  
legality	  and	  illegality	  are	  clear-­‐cut,	  well-­‐defined	  and	  generally	  accepted	  notions	  beyond	  any	  
doubt.	  In	  this	  paper,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  we	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  case.	  We	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  legality	  and	  illegality	  of	  internet	  usage	  practices	  are	  socially	  constructed	  
notions	  which	  have	  been	  changing	  over	  time	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  future	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
shifting	  social	  power	  relations.	  In	  particular,	  we	  maintain	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  online	  copyright	  
infringement,	  the	  notion	  of	  “consuming	  the	  illegal”	  is	  misleading	  in	  at	  least	  two	  regards.	  
First,	  the	  (il-­‐)legality	  of	  many	  online	  consumption	  practices	  has	  been	  and	  still	  is	  far	  from	  clear.	  
In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  diffusion	  of	  new	  technological	  developments,	  the	  borders	  between	  legal	  
and	  illegal	  activities	  are	  regularly	  adjusted	  or	  even	  re-­‐drawn	  (Wu	  2010).	  Such	  processes	  of	  (re-­‐
)defining	  the	  (il-­‐)legality	  of	  certain	  practices	  involve	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  who	  
engage	  in	  what	  Black	  (2002:	  163)	  terms	  “regulatory	  conversations”,	  i.e.	  “communicative	  
interactions	  that	  occur	  between	  all	  involved	  in	  the	  regulatory	  ‘space’”.	  Especially	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
business,	  what	  eventually	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  illegal	  is	  thus	  the	  outcome	  of	  continuous	  and,	  
according	  to	  Braithwaite	  and	  Drahos	  (2000:	  32)	  ‘surprisingly	  deliberative’	  regulatory	  contests.	  
In	  the	  field	  of	  copyright	  regulation,	  the	  set	  of	  practices	  considered	  ‘illegal’	  has	  been	  neither	  
stable	  over	  time	  nor	  across	  geographical	  boundaries.	  Both	  corporate	  and	  individual	  actors	  face	  
– and	  may	  even	  try	  to	  create	  or	  exploit	  –	  this	  regulatory	  uncertainty.	  To	  address	  the	  issue	  of
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“consuming	  the	  illegal”	  therefore	  requires	  answering	  the	  questions,	  who	  defines	  what	  is	  
considered	  as	  legal	  or	  illegal	  in	  rapidly	  changing	  environments?	  
Second,	  the	  notion	  of	  “consumption”	  is	  increasingly	  inadequate	  or	  insufficient	  to	  describe	  a	  
growing	  portion	  of	  online	  usage	  practices.	  ‘Consuming’	  digital	  content	  online	  increasingly	  
implies	  creatively	  transforming	  it	  and	  making	  it	  publicly	  available	  as	  user-­‐generated	  content	  
(UGC,	  see	  Elkin-­‐Koren	  2009),	  leading	  to	  neologism	  such	  as	  “prosumer”	  or	  “produser”	  (Bruns	  
2006).	  Even	  when	  taking	  into	  account	  that	  only	  a	  minority	  of	  users	  will	  actively	  interact	  with	  a	  
certain	  piece	  of	  work	  while	  the	  majority	  will	  just	  consume	  it	  (van	  Dijck	  2009),	  it	  remains	  a	  fact	  
that,	  on	  the	  whole,	  consumption	  of	  online	  content	  regularly	  and	  routinely	  interferes	  with	  
extant	  copyright	  provisions.	  This	  user	  behavior,	  however,	  is	  enabled	  by	  corporate	  services,	  
which	  –	  if	  not	  require	  –	  tempt	  such	  (potentially)	  infringing	  usage	  practices.	  Examples	  are	  online	  
video	  sharing	  platforms	  such	  as	  Google’s	  YouTube	  (see	  Cha	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Bajde	  2010)	  or	  online	  
social	  networks	  such	  as	  Facebook.	  Consequently,	  the	  legality	  of	  consumption	  practices	  is	  not	  
only	  in	  doubt	  but	  also	  these	  consumption	  practices	  themselves	  are	  constantly	  changing.	  In	  turn,	  
newly	  emerging	  consumption	  and	  usage	  practices	  tend	  to	  feed	  back	  into	  regulatory	  processes	  
(e.g.	  through	  court	  decisions),	  thereby	  further	  enhancing	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  for	  all	  
participants.	  
In	  what	  follows,	  we	  want	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  interrelationship	  between	  these	  two	  issues	  –
regulatory	  uncertainty	  and	  changing	  user	  and	  business	  practices	  –	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transnational	  
copyright	  regulation.	  Conceptualizing	  transnational	  regulation	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  distributed	  
agency	  (Quack	  2007)	  requires	  a	  recursive	  perspective	  (Luhmann	  2004;	  Nobles	  and	  Schiff	  2009)	  
which	  situates	  the	  application	  of	  the	  code	  legal/illegal	  occurs	  in	  regulatory	  conversations	  which	  
form	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  regulatory	  system.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  there	  is	  no	  final	  and	  last	  authority	  
deciding	  on	  the	  question	  of	  (il-­‐)legality.	  Rather,	  various	  and	  competing	  actors,	  claiming	  
authority	  to	  do	  so	  co-­‐construct	  the	  demarcation	  between	  legal	  and	  illegal	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
regulatory	  and	  non-­‐regulatory	  practices	  and	  arbitral	  verdicts.	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Origins	  of	  Regulatory	  Uncertainty	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Copyright	  
To	  some	  degree,	  uncertainty	  is	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  any	  legal	  or	  regulatory	  framework.	  
Following	  rules	  always	  implies	  subsuming	  idiosyncratic	  situations	  under	  generalized	  
prescriptions.	  These	  generalized	  prescriptions	  may	  come	  in	  form	  of	  specific	  rules	  or	  vague	  
principles	  (Braithwaite	  2002),	  but	  even	  the	  most	  specific	  prescriptions	  contain	  (at	  least	  a	  grain	  
of)	  indeterminacy.	  In	  arbitration	  or	  any	  due	  process	  of	  law,	  this	  indeterminacy	  is	  in	  turn	  the	  
motivation	  for	  opposing	  parties	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  process	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and,	  eventually,	  to	  
accept	  decisions	  (Luhmann	  2004).	  	  
In	  transnational	  governance,	  however,	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  is	  enhanced	  and	  multiplied	  by	  the	  
lack	  of	  a	  universally	  recognized	  single	  authority	  in	  charge	  of	  law-­‐making	  and	  the	  indeterminacy	  
arising	  from	  the	  variety	  and	  distinctiveness	  of	  local	  contexts	  in	  which	  legal	  rules	  have	  to	  be	  
applied.	  In	  the	  copyright	  field,	  we	  identify	  (1)	  international	  regime	  complexity,	  (2)	  regulatory	  
asymmetries	  and	  ambiguities,	  and	  (3)	  regulatory	  drift	  as	  the	  major	  reasons	  why	  actors	  struggle	  
with	  drawing	  the	  line	  between	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  illegal.	  
(a)	  Regime	  complexity	  
According	  to	  Alter	  and	  Meunier	  (2009:	  16),	  “international	  regime	  complexity	  reduces	  the	  clarity	  
of	  legal	  obligation	  by	  introducing	  overlapping	  sets	  of	  legal	  rules	  and	  jurisdictions	  governing	  an	  
issue.”	  Especially	  the	  lack	  of	  hierarchy	  distinguishes	  international	  from	  domestic	  regime	  
complexity,	  albeit	  only	  “few	  studies	  and	  even	  fewer	  theories	  are	  available	  to	  guide	  scholars	  in	  
thinking	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  complexity”	  (Alter	  and	  Meunier	  2009:	  13).	  	  
One	  consequence	  and	  source	  of	  regime	  complexity	  at	  the	  same	  time	  is	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
forum-­‐shifting	  tactics,	  where	  “[p]arties	  might	  move	  an	  agenda	  from	  one	  forum	  to	  another,	  exit	  
a	  forum	  altogether	  […],	  or	  pursue	  agendas	  simultaneously	  in	  multiple	  forums”	  (Sell	  2010:	  2).	  In	  
addition	  to	  forum	  shopping	  in	  the	  political	  sphere,	  actors	  may	  also	  turn	  to	  private	  regulatory	  
endeavors	  via	  standards	  (see	  Table	  1),	  underlining	  Drahos’	  (2007)	  observation	  that	  “some	  
negotiations	  are	  never	  really	  over”.	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Teubner	  and	  Fischer-­‐Lescano	  (2004:	  1004)	  go	  one	  step	  further	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  growing	  
regime	  complexity	  “is	  not	  simply	  about	  legal	  norm	  collisions	  or	  policy	  conflicts,	  but	  rather	  has	  
its	  origin	  in	  contradictions	  between	  society-­‐wide	  institutionalized	  rationalities”.	  Note	  that	  with	  
this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  Teubner	  and	  Fischer-­‐Lescano	  dismiss	  reducing	  regime	  complexity	  to	  mere	  
legal	  or	  political	  dynamics	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  acknowledge	  the	  relevance	  of	  those	  very	  
dynamics	  for	  regulatory	  regimes.	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  of	  overlapping	  regulatory	  regimes	  that	  increased	  precision	  of	  rules	  need	  not	  
–	  and	  regularly	  will	  not	  –	  result	  in	  increased	  certainty.	  Since	  detailed	  provisions	  create	  internal	  
inconsistencies	  and	  contradictions,	  loopholes	  and	  facilitate	  legal	  entrepreneurship	  in	  form	  of	  
“creative	  compliance”	  (Black	  2002:	  180),	  attempts	  to	  regulatory	  mirror	  innovative	  technological	  
and	  market	  developments	  may	  paradoxically	  lead	  to	  increased	  uncertainty.	  And	  as	  
demonstrated	  by	  Raustiala	  and	  Victor	  (2004)	  for	  the	  case	  of	  plant	  genetic	  resources,	  this	  
uncertainty	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  distinct	  but	  overlapping	  regimes	  and	  related	  forums	  for	  
negotiation,	  may	  be	  multiplied	  by	  inconsistencies	  through	  implementation	  and	  interpretation	  
processes	  on	  national	  levels.	  	  
Regime	   Forums	   Regulatory	  outcome	  
International	  Treaties	   WTO,	  UN/WIPO	  
TRIPS	  treaty,	  WIPO	  
Copyright	  Treaty	  (WCT),	  
WIPO	  Performances	  and	  
Phonograms	  Treaty	  (WPPT)	  
(Supra-­‐)national	  law	   European	  Union,	  nation	  legislative	  bodies	  
EU	  copyright	  directives,	  
national	  laws	  
Private	  regulation	  via	  
standards	  
Industry	  networks	  (CPTWG,	  
SDMI),	  Standard	  setting	  
organizations	  (Creative	  
Commons,	  FSF)1	  
Digital	  Rights	  Management,	  
Open	  Content	  Licensing	  
Table	  1:	  Regulatory	  regimes	  in	  the	  copyright	  field	  
                                                
1 Acronyms: Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG), Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI, 
disbanded in 2003), Free Software Foundation (FSF). 
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Regime	  complexity	  in	  the	  sense	  as	  we	  use	  it	  in	  the	  following	  is	  constituted	  by	  both	  overlaps	  of	  
different	  functional	  regulatory	  regimes,	  as	  well	  as	  overlaps	  of	  different	  jurisdictional	  layers	  
within	  a	  given	  functional	  multi-­‐level	  regime.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  transnational	  copyright	  regulation,	  
we	  find	  at	  least	  three	  overlapping	  regimes	  with	  related	  forums	  and	  distinct	  regulatory	  
outcomes	  on	  both	  the	  transnational	  and	  the	  national	  level	  (see	  Table	  1).	  In	  all	  these	  regimes	  we	  
can	  observe	  actors	  pursuing	  (at	  least:	  partially)	  contradictory	  agendas	  in	  different	  forums.	  In	  
the	  cases	  of	  international	  treaties	  and	  (supra-­‐)national	  legislation,	  regulation	  is	  negotiated	  and	  
conflicts	  have	  to	  be	  resolved	  in	  each	  forum,	  leading	  actors	  to	  pursue	  forum	  shopping	  strategies	  
(Helfer	  2004;	  Raustiala	  and	  Victor	  2004).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  private	  regulation	  via	  standards,	  we	  find	  
competing	  attempts	  of	  regulation	  with	  conflicts	  being	  resolved	  either	  in	  form	  of	  negotiation	  
within	  certain	  forums	  or	  via	  competition	  for	  dominance	  among	  potential	  standard	  adopters	  
(Dobusch	  and	  Quack	  2012).	  
(b)	  Regulatory	  asymmetries	  and	  ambiguities	  
Another	  source	  for	  uncertainty	  are	  regulatory	  asymmetries	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  specific	  provisions	  
are	  crafted.	  Specificity	  may	  vary	  between	  different	  regimes	  or	  between	  different	  levels.	  
Especially	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  international	  treaties	  “[n]egotiators	  adopt	  broad	  rules	  because	  it	  is	  
extremely	  difficult	  to	  work	  out	  the	  fine	  detail	  for	  all	  contingencies	  ex	  ante.”	  (Raustiala	  and	  
Victor	  2004:	  302).	  (Un-­‐)Specificity	  is	  however	  not	  equally	  distributed	  within	  a	  regulatory	  
regime.	  According	  to	  Wielsch	  (2010:	  3)	  an	  “early	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  international	  copyright	  
regime”	  is	  that	  “in	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  only	  the	  minimum	  standard	  of	  protection	  was	  
mandatory	  whereas	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  were	  discretionary	  and	  without	  any	  force	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  state	  action.”	  
Even	  one	  of	  the	  core	  provisions	  of	  transnational	  copyright	  regulation,	  the	  so-­‐called	  “three-­‐step	  
test”	  dealing	  with	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  to	  copyright	  protection	  (see,	  for	  example,	  articles	  
13	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement)2,	  is	  an	  example	  for	  regulatory	  asymmetries	  and	  ambiguities.	  The	  
                                                
2 The respective passage in article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement reads as follows: “Members shall confine limitations 
and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.” 
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three-­‐step	  test	  was	  first	  introduced	  in	  the	  Berne	  Convention	  1967	  and	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  
“a	  flexible,	  open	  provision	  offering	  much	  room	  for	  interpretation”	  (Senftleben	  2006:	  407).	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  specificity	  of	  copyright	  exceptions	  based	  upon	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  three-­‐step	  
test	  varies	  significantly,	  for	  example	  between	  the	  US	  and	  its	  unspecific	  Fair	  Use	  exemption	  and	  
the	  European	  Union’s	  exhaustive	  and	  comparably	  specific	  list	  of	  potential	  limitations	  in	  the	  EU	  
Directive	  2001/29/EC	  (see	  also	  Newby	  1999;	  Ginsberg	  2000).	  
Furthermore,	  specificity	  may	  vary	  across	  distinct	  but	  interlinked	  subjects	  even	  within	  one	  
regime,	  something	  Yu	  (2007:	  28)	  refers	  to	  as	  “issue-­‐based	  conflicts”.	  Compare,	  for	  example,	  the	  
broad	  rules	  based	  upon	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  with	  the	  concrete	  and	  specific	  provisions	  dealing	  
with	  (the	  circumvention	  of)	  copy	  protection	  measures	  in	  articles	  11	  and	  12	  of	  the	  WIPO	  
Copyright	  Treaty.	  	  
Assessing	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  asymmetries	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  may	  
then	  be	  further	  complicated	  when	  taking	  Braithwaite’s	  (2002)	  arguments	  on	  legal	  certainty	  into	  
account.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Braithwaite	  convincingly	  argues	  that	  regulation	  in	  form	  of	  
specific	  prescriptions	  need	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  greater	  certainty	  than	  unspecific	  or	  vague	  
principles.	  His	  main	  hypothesis	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
“As	  the	  complexity,	  flux	  and	  size	  of	  regulated	  economic	  interests	  increase,	  certainty	  
progressively	  moves	  from	  being	  positively	  associated	  with	  the	  specificity	  of	  acts	  
mandated	  by	  rules	  to	  being	  negatively	  associated	  with	  rule	  specificity.”	  (Braithwaite	  
2002:	  52)	  
Asymmetries	  in	  terms	  of	  specificity	  are	  further	  complemented	  by	  ambiguities,	  which	  may	  have	  
been	  intentionally	  built	  into	  regulatory	  devices	  (Yu	  2007).	  The	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  for	  instance,	  
includes	  several	  passages	  that	  are	  not	  only	  vague	  but	  allow	  for	  different	  interpretations	  and	  
represent,	  at	  least	  according	  to	  Watal	  (2001)	  “constructive	  ambiguities”,	  in	  that	  they	  preserve	  
at	  least	  some	  national	  legislatory	  leeway	  (see	  also	  Raustiala	  and	  Victor’s	  (2004)	  notion	  of	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“strategic	  ambiguity”).	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  already	  mentioned	  anti-­‐circumvention	  provision	  
in	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Copyright	  treaty,	  which	  prohibits	  circumvention	  only	  in	  case	  a	  
technological	  measure	  is	  “effective”.	  This	  allows	  for	  interpretations	  ranging	  from	  very	  broad,	  
i.e.	  effective	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “in	  place”,	  to	  very	  narrow,	  i.e.	  effective	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “potent”.	  
This	  is	  also	  an	  example	  of	  how	  ambiguity	  increases	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  even	  though	  
provisions	  are	  relatively	  concrete	  and	  specific.	  
Taken	  together,	  regulatory	  asymmetries	  and	  ambiguities	  foster	  or	  re-­‐introduce	  differences	  
even	  in	  inter-­‐	  or	  supranationally	  harmonized	  regulation,	  thereby	  increasing	  regulatory	  
uncertainty	  for	  transnational	  copyright-­‐related	  practices.	  
(c)	  Regulatory	  drift	  
The	  reasons	  for	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  discussed	  so	  far	  –	  regime	  complexity	  as	  well	  as	  
regulatory	  asymmetry	  and	  ambiguity	  –	  are	  more	  or	  less	  static	  characteristics	  of	  regulatory	  
complexes	  in	  a	  certain	  field,	  which	  potentially	  obscure	  the	  demarcation	  line	  between	  legal	  and	  
illegal	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  Logical	  consequence	  of	  these	  uncertainties	  is	  the	  growing	  importance	  
of	  courts	  and	  other	  arbitral	  authorities	  for	  crafting	  and	  concretizing	  regulation	  when	  deciding	  
individual	  cases	  (Quack	  2007).	  	  
From	  a	  dynamic	  perspective	  on	  regulation,	  however,	  changes	  in	  meaning	  and	  interpretation	  
need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  which	  result	  from	  continuous	  (re-­‐)application	  of	  certain	  legal	  
rules.	  To	  a	  certain	  degree,	  applying	  rules	  necessarily	  results	  in	  (slight	  or	  marginal,	  but	  still)	  
changing	  rules	  –	  a	  phenomenon	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  “regulatory	  drift”	  (Ortmann	  
2010)3.	  In	  this	  context,	  Ortmann	  (2010:	  206)	  describes	  why	  slight	  but	  recurrent	  deviation,	  
resulting	  in	  unintended,	  subtle	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  regulatory	  movements,	  cannot	  be	  avoided	  all-­‐
together:	  	  
                                                
3 Discussions of “institutional drift” (Hacker 2004, Thelen and Streeck 2005) approach this phenomenon from a 
macro-perspective, referring to the gradual decay of institutions as a result of “slippage”, i.e. when constituencies 
and practices to which institutionalized rules were directed gradually fade away. 
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“[D]eviation	  allows	  for	  flexibility	  and	  situational	  appropriateness.	  […]	  If	  it	  were	  
impossible	  to	  violate	  rules,	  there	  would	  be	  nothing	  for	  rules	  to	  regulate.	  Rules	  don’t	  
make	  sense	  with	  regard	  to	  either	  pure	  necessity	  or	  pure	  impossibility,	  but	  only	  with	  
regard	  to	  contingency.”4	  
Whether	  deviation	  in	  a	  grey	  zone	  or	  open	  rule-­‐breaking	  will	  become	  accepted	  and	  legitimized	  
as	  a	  legal	  practice	  or	  be	  defined	  as	  illegal	  practice,	  regularly	  becomes	  known	  only	  in	  retrospect.5	  
A	  prominent	  case	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  copyright	  regulation	  for	  such	  a	  dynamic	  is	  Google’s	  attempt	  of	  
retroactively	  legalizing	  its	  (seemingly)	  illegal	  mass-­‐digitization	  of	  books	  in	  the	  course	  of	  its	  
Google	  Books	  project	  (for	  details	  see	  Samuelson	  2010).6	  Exploiting	  extant	  regulatory	  
uncertainty	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Fair-­‐Use	  clause	  in	  US	  copyright	  law,	  Google	  tried	  to	  
settle	  related	  controversies	  and	  thereby	  (re-­‐)define	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  clause	  in	  form	  of	  a	  private,	  
court-­‐approved	  agreement	  (the	  so-­‐called	  “Google	  Books	  Settlement”).	  
This	  also	  indicates,	  what	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  paper,	  namely	  how	  
regulatory	  uncertainty	  may	  be	  reduced	  or	  enforced	  by	  usage	  practices	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  field.	  	  
Practicing	  Regulatory	  Uncertainty	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Copyright	  
All	  three	  sources	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  discussed	  so	  far	  have	  in	  common	  a	  concept	  of	  
regulation	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  recursive	  processes	  of	  emergent	  and	  deliberative	  law-­‐making	  by	  
a	  distributed	  set	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (Quack	  2007).	  Discursive	  and	  non-­‐discursive	  
usage	  and	  regulatory	  practices	  are	  part	  of	  this	  recursive	  law-­‐making.	  For	  intellectual	  property	  
regulation	  in	  general,	  Wielsch	  (2010:	  9)	  describes	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  follows:	  
                                                
4 Alluding to Wittgenstein (1958), Feldman and Pentland (2003: 101) argue that “no amount of rules is sufficient to 
specify a pattern of behavior fully, because the interpretation of any rule, or any part of a rule, requires more rules”. 
5 In this regard, we consider high regulatory uncertainty as potentially being an inspiration – if not a prerequisite – 
for innovation, which is why we do not deem regulatory uncertainty to be necessarily problematic or harmful. For an 
innovation to become established or settled, however, probably also requires reducing the regulatory uncertainty that 
inspired or enabled this innovation in the first place. 
6 Whether mass-digitization of books for providing services such as Google’s Book Search, which presents short 
pieces (“snippets”) also of copyrighted books, is covered at least by the US Fair Use clause is still an open question 
and thus a case of regulatory uncertainty. Also the recent rejection of the Google Book Settlement (Authors Guild v 
Google, March 22, 2011) has not clarified that issue. 
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“In	  the	  years	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  TRIPS	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  neither	  the	  WTO	  nor	  
WIPO,	  the	  other	  big	  institutional	  actor	  in	  international	  IP	  policy,	  is	  the	  only	  author	  
of	  IP	  rules	  with	  a	  de	  facto	  global	  reach.	  IP	  lawmaking	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  also	  occurs	  –	  
among	  others	  –	  in	  the	  practices	  of	  multinational	  information	  industry	  actors;	  in	  the	  
adjudication	  of	  national	  courts	  that	  are	  beginning	  to	  develop	  a	  private	  international	  
law	  of	  IP;	  in	  the	  constraints	  digital	  technology	  places	  on	  behavior	  without	  regard	  to	  
territory	  (“code	  is	  law”);	  in	  transnational	  operating	  NGOs;	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  new	  
actors	  who	  cooperate	  in	  transnational	  networks;	  in	  other	  international	  institutions	  
that	  find	  their	  work	  affected	  by	  intellectual	  property	  law[.]”	  
When	  we	  now	  focus	  practices	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  context	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  
field	  of	  copyright,	  we	  conceptualize	  ‘a	  practice’	  in	  line	  with	  Reckwitz	  (2002:	  249)	  as	  “a	  
routinized	  type	  of	  behaviour	  which	  consists	  of	  several	  elements,	  interconnected	  to	  one	  other:	  
forms	  of	  bodily	  activities,	  forms	  of	  mental	  activities,	  ‘things’	  and	  their	  use,	  a	  background	  
knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  understanding,	  know-­‐how,	  states	  of	  emotion	  and	  motivational	  
knowledge.”	  Analytically,	  we	  further	  distinguish	  two	  broad	  categories	  of	  practices:	  (1)	  
regulatory	  practices	  intentionally	  and	  directly	  contributing	  to	  regulatory	  conversations	  sensu	  
Black	  (2002)	  and	  (2)	  usage	  practices	  which	  do	  not	  directly	  address	  regulatory	  issues	  but	  might	  
indirectly	  influence	  rule-­‐making	  and	  rule-­‐enforcement.	  Since	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  extant	  
literature	  on	  regulatory	  processes	  deals	  with	  regulatory	  practices	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense7	  –	  even	  
when	  only	  rarely	  adopting	  a	  practice	  perspective	  –	  we	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  second	  category	  of	  
usage	  practices.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  approach	  them	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  judicial	  practices	  of	  
decision-­‐making	  on	  cases	  for	  which	  the	  written	  law	  “on	  the	  books”,	  i.e.	  international	  treaties	  
and	  their	  national	  implementations,	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  and	  generally	  accepted	  
answer.	  
                                                
7 Practices by non-state actors that directly address regulatory uncertainty via regulatory actions are, for example, 
lobbying to influence political rule-making processes (e.g. Lowery (2007) or developing and propagating private 
regulation in form of standards to account for perceived shortcomings in public regulatory frameworks (e.g. 
Dobusch and Quack 2010). 
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Even	  though	  not	  directly	  regulatory	  in	  nature,	  usage	  practices	  may	  –	  intentionally	  or	  
unintentionally	  –	  contribute	  indirectly	  to	  regulatory	  conversations	  in	  that	  the	  respective	  (non-­‐)	  
compliance	  is	  inspiration	  for,	  subject	  of	  or	  even	  part	  of	  related	  regulatory	  practices.	  This	  is	  most	  
obvious	  in	  the	  case	  of	  private	  regulation	  via	  standards	  (see	  Table	  1),	  where	  adoption	  and	  
compliance	  directly	  contribute	  to	  both	  legitimacy	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regulation,	  but	  holds	  
to	  a	  probably	  lesser	  degree	  for	  any	  type	  of	  regulation,	  as	  well.	  The	  contribution	  of	  usage	  
practices	  to	  legitimacy	  and	  effectiveness	  or	  regulation	  is	  thereby	  however	  only	  a	  side-­‐effect.8	  
In	  the	  field	  of	  copyright	  regulation,	  particularly	  new	  online	  usage	  practices	  have	  been	  at	  the	  
center	  of	  regulatory	  conversations	  since	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Internet	  (see,	  for	  example,	  
Green	  2002;	  Benkler	  2006).	  Most	  importantly,	  in	  1996	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty	  
introduced	  the	  “right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public”,	  which	  endowed	  rights	  holders	  with	  an	  
“exclusive	  right	  of	  authorizing	  any	  communication	  to	  the	  public	  of	  their	  works,	  by	  wire	  or	  
wireless	  means”.	  This	  provision	  and	  its	  national	  implementations	  respectively,	  is	  however	  be	  
limited	  by	  exceptions	  compatible	  with	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  such	  as	  the	  US	  Fair	  Use	  clause	  or	  the	  
European	  limitations	  and	  exceptions	  clauses.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  new	  “right	  of	  
communication	  to	  the	  public”	  did	  not	  close	  but	  rather	  generated	  further	  regulatory	  
conversations	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  new	  online	  usage	  practices.	  	  
Within	  these	  conversations,	  regularly	  two	  distinct	  types	  of	  actors	  are	  differentiated	  that	  are	  
involved	  in	  online	  usage	  practices	  such	  as	  consuming,	  sharing	  or	  interacting	  with	  content	  online	  
(see	  Table	  2):	  (a)	  end-­‐users	  and	  (b)	  intermediaries.9	  	  
                                                
8 Usage practices may nevertheless be strategically tied to regulatory uncertainty as demonstrated by Engau and 
Hoffmann (2011) in their assessment of corporate response strategies to regulatory uncertainty in the field of climate 
change regulation. They distinguish between a large set of potential response practices, subsumed under the four 
categories avoiding, reducing, adapting, and disregarding (Engau and Hoffmann 2011: 57). However, as we will 
demonstrate below, usage practices need not be strategically directed at regulatory uncertainty to have an impact on 
the respective regulatory conversations. 
9 Note that this analytical distinction may be empirically difficult or even impossible to make in the realm of new 
online practices such as peer-to-peer file sharing with peer-produced open source software tools. 
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For	  one,	  end-­‐users	  –	  the	  group	  previously	  described	  as	  consumers	  –	  are	  confronted	  with	  
questions	  regarding	  the	  legality	  of	  their	  online	  usage	  practices	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts,	  ranging	  
from	  watching	  movies	  online	  (Is	  consuming	  content	  from	  an	  illegal	  source	  legal?)	  over	  linking	  to	  
content	  (Is	  linking	  to	  potentially	  illegal	  content	  legal?)	  to	  interacting	  with	  existing	  works	  online	  
(Is	  adapting	  or	  remixing	  content	  legal?)	  	  
For	  another,	  (new)	  intermediaries	  such	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  online	  social	  networks	  or	  platforms	  
for	  user-­‐generated	  content	  (e.g.	  Facebook,	  YouTube)	  face	  different	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  
same	  usage	  practices,	  in	  that	  they	  enable,	  foster	  or	  –	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Bittorrent	  peer-­‐to-­‐
peer	  filesharing	  software10	  –	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  require	  practices	  potentially	  conflicting	  with	  
copyright	  regulation.	  
For	  both	  end-­‐users	  and	  intermediaries,	  different	  usage	  practices	  may	  yield	  different	  regulatory	  
consequences.	  While	  Tables	  2	  and	  3	  distinguish	  analytically	  between	  four	  different	  types	  of	  
usage	  practices,	  empirically	  these	  might	  be	  difficult	  to	  separate.	  For	  instance,	  linking	  to	  a	  remix	  
of	  two	  videos	  hosted	  at	  an	  online	  platform	  (e.g.	  YouTube)	  within	  a	  social	  network	  (e.g.	  
Facebook)	  exhibits	  all	  of	  the	  practices	  mentioned	  below	  uno	  actu.	  	  
The	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  listed	  in	  Table	  2,	  given	  by	  either	  regulatory	  or	  arbitral	  authorities,	  
are	  of	  importance	  for	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  related	  innovations	  and	  thus	  overall	  technological	  
and	  economic	  development.	  Although	  all	  of	  the	  questions	  relate	  to	  (exceptions	  and	  limitations	  
to)	  the	  right	  of	  communication	  to	  the	  public,	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  may	  stem	  from	  all	  three	  
sources	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  Regime	  complexity	  is	  at	  stake	  when	  end-­‐user	  and	  
intermediary	  belong	  to	  jurisdictions	  with	  limitations	  and	  exceptions	  of	  different	  scope.	  The	  
scope	  of	  these	  limitations	  and	  exceptions	  may	  in	  turn	  empower	  some	  actors	  while	  
disadvantaging	  others	  and	  prone	  to	  changes	  –	  regulatory	  drift	  –	  over	  time.	  
	  
                                                
10 The peer-to-peer file sharing protocol Bittorrent is widely used (see Schulze and Mochalski 2009) for distributing 
large amounts of data such as videos by simultaneously downloading and uploading from all users interested in a 
given file. This requirement to not only download but also upload content makes any user a potential infringer, when 
the source file is not legally offered. 
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Online	  usage	  practices	   End-­‐user	   Intermediary	  
watching/listening/reading	  
(consuming	  in	  a	  narrow	  
sense)	  
Is	  the	  source	  legal?	  	  
Is	  watching/listening/reading	  
from	  an	  illegal	  source	  legal?	  
Is	  providing	  tools	  for	  
watching/listening/reading	  
legal?	  
linking	   Is	  linking	  to	  (illegal)	  content	  legal?	  
Is	  providing	  the	  tools	  for	  
linking	  to	  content	  legal?	  
storing/offering	   Is	  storing/offering	  the	  content	  legal?	  
Is	  providing	  tools	  for	  
storing/offering	  (illegal)	  
content	  legal?	  
interacting/creating	  online	   Is	  interacting/creating	  with	  the	  content	  online	  legal?	  
Is	  providing	  tools	  for	  
interacting/creating	  with	  
online	  content	  legal?	  
Table	  2:	  Online	  usage	  practices	  of	  end-­‐users	  and	  intermediaries	  and	  respective	  questions	  of	  	  
(il-­‐)legality.	  
As	  described,	  for	  example,	  by	  Wu	  (2010),	  specifically	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  telecommunication	  
markets	  has	  been	  regularly	  shaped	  not	  only	  by	  legislation	  but	  also	  by	  litigation	  (see,	  for	  
instance,	  the	  introduction	  of	  cable	  televison,	  Wu	  2010:	  180).	  Recent	  examples	  of	  paving	  the	  
way	  for	  or	  shutting	  down	  new	  businesses	  and	  thereby	  often	  the	  overall	  business	  model	  have	  
been	  the	  failed	  attempt	  to	  forbid	  the	  sale	  of	  portable	  MP3	  devices	  (RIAA	  v.	  Diamond)	  or	  the	  
successful	  litigation	  against	  (certain	  forms	  of)	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  file-­‐sharing	  services	  such	  as	  Napster	  
(A&M	  Records	  v.	  Napster)	  or,	  most	  recently,	  Lime	  Wire	  (Arista	  v.	  Lime	  Wire;	  Table	  3	  gives	  
further	  examples,	  some	  of	  them	  taken	  from	  Elkin-­‐Koren	  2009;	  Riefa	  2009;	  Borghi	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
Especially	  the	  last	  two	  cases	  are	  instructive	  since	  both	  services	  did	  not	  directly	  host	  copyrighted	  
materials	  without	  consent	  of	  the	  rights	  holders	  but	  fostered	  exchange	  by	  providing	  links	  to	  such	  
content	  hosted	  by	  end-­‐users	  (“peers”).	  Such	  ‘secondary	  infringement’,	  i.e.	  fostering	  
infringement	  by	  others,	  was	  also	  an	  issue	  in	  trials	  involving	  end-­‐users	  linking	  to	  content	  placed	  
online	  without	  consent	  of	  the	  rights	  holder	  (e.g.	  Intellectual	  Reserve	  v.	  Utah	  Lighthouse	  
Ministry;	  )	  or	  to	  material	  in	  conflict	  with	  anti-­‐circumvention	  provisions	  (e.g.	  Universal	  City	  
Studies	  v.	  Corley,	  see	  Table	  3).11	  	  
                                                
11 For the latter see also a recent decision by the German Bundesgerichtshof (Az. I ZR 39/08). 
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Online	  usage	  practices	   End-­‐user	   Intermediary	  
watching/listening/reading	  
(consuming	  in	  a	  narrow	  
sense)	  
-­‐	   RIAA	  v.	  Diamond	  (“Rio	  case”,	  1998)12	  
linking	  
Intellectual	  Reserve	  v.	  Utah	  
Lighthouse	  Ministry	  
(1999)13	  
Universal	  City	  Studios	  v.	  
Corley	  (2001)14	  
A&M	  Records	  v.	  Napster	  
(2001)	  
Arista	  v.	  Lime	  Wire	  (2010)	  15	  
storing/offering	  
e.g.	  Warner	  v.	  DeWitt	  (2007)	  
or	  Interscope	  v.	  Rodriguez	  
(2007)16	  
Viacom	  v.	  YouTube	  (2007)17	  
GEMA	  v.	  RapidShare	  (2010)	  18	  
interacting/creating	  online	  
Lenz	  v.	  Universal	  Music	  Corp.	  
(2008)19	  
Sapient	  v.	  Geller	  (2008)20	  
Warner	  Bros.	  Entertainment	  
et	  al.	  v.	  RDR	  Books	  et	  al.	  
(2008)	  21	  
Table	  3:	  Exemplary	  court	  cases	  dealing	  with	  online	  usage	  practices	  of	  end-­‐users	  and	  intermediaries	  	  
While	  we	  cannot	  go	  into	  the	  details	  of	  the	  cases	  listed	  in	  Table	  3,	  we	  can	  draw	  at	  least	  three	  
conclusions	  from	  this	  brief	  overview.	  First,	  only	  consumption	  in	  the	  most	  narrow	  sense	  –	  
watching,	  listening,	  and	  reading	  by	  end-­‐users	  –	  has	  not	  been	  subject	  of	  legal	  controversies	  in	  
court.	  Second,	  consumption	  in	  a	  broader	  sense,	  understood	  as	  usage	  practices	  prevalent	  
among	  large	  crowds	  –	  if	  not	  the	  majority	  –	  of	  end-­‐user	  such	  as	  linking,	  storing	  or	  interacting	  
with	  content	  online	  (see	  Yar	  2005),	  has	  now	  continuously	  inspired	  legal	  controversy	  over	  the	  
past	  decade	  and	  across	  different	  jurisdictions.	  Third,	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  the	  plaintiffs	  are	  
representatives	  of	  established	  (“old”)	  industry	  actors	  (e.g.	  Universal	  Music,	  Viacom,	  Warner	  
Bros.)	  seeking	  to	  protect	  their	  business	  model	  against	  both	  new	  intermediaries	  and	  new	  end-­‐
                                                
12 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (1998) 
13 Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) 
14 Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) 
15 Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (2010) 
16 An extensive collection of cases directly involving end-users can be found in the “Index of Litigation Documents 
Referred to in "Recording Industry vs. The People” prepared by Ray Beckerman, online: 
http://beckermanlegal.com/Documents.htm [March 26, 2011] 
17 Viacom International Inc., et al, v. YouTube Inc. and Google Inc. Case 1:07-cv-02103-LLS (U.S.D.C. Southern 
District of New York, filed 13th March 2007) 
18 OLG Düsseldorf, decision from April 27, 2010, Az. I-20 U 166/09 
19 Stephanie Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, Case 5:07-cv-03783 JF (U.S.D.C. Northern District of California filed 
on 08/20/08) 
20 John Doe aka Brian Sapient v. Uri Geller and Explorogist Ltd.  Case 3:07-cv-02478-VRW (U.S.D.C. Northern 
District of California, filed 2nd March 2008) 
21 Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. et al. v. RDR Books et al. (575 F.Supp.2d 513). 
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user	  practices;	  directly	  and	  on	  a	  relatively	  broad	  scale	  targeting	  end-­‐users	  not	  only	  via	  
marketing	  and	  education	  efforts	  but	  also	  via	  litigation22	  is	  thereby	  a	  comparably	  new	  
phenomenon,	  whereas	  legal	  battles	  against	  new	  intermediaries	  have	  always	  accompanied	  
technological	  change	  and	  innovation	  (Wu	  2010).23	  	  
The	  national	  character	  of	  these	  individual	  decisions	  may,	  however,	  lead	  to	  inconsistencies	  and	  
thus	  even	  greater	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  in	  that	  different	  interpretations	  in	  this	  decentralized	  
process	  of	  law-­‐making	  feed	  back	  into	  the	  overall	  uncertainty	  and	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  respective	  
copyright	  provisions.	  It	  is	  this	  transnational	  dimension	  that	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  in	  the	  subsequent	  
section.	  
Transnational	  Regulation	  and	  Transnational	  Practices	  
Whether	  differences	  and	  contradictions	  between	  regulatory	  regimes	  and	  the	  respective	  
decisions	  increase	  overall	  regulatory	  uncertainty,	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  actors	  and	  
practices	  span	  these	  different	  regimes.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  copyright,	  regime	  complexity	  was	  and	  
still	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  problem	  for	  activities	  restricted	  to	  one	  national	  jurisdiction;	  differences	  
between	  transnational	  regimes	  are	  mediated	  and	  thus	  “resolved”	  via	  the	  specific	  national	  
regulatory	  regime.	  However,	  as	  soon	  as	  activities	  transcend	  these	  national	  borders	  –	  something	  
which	  has	  become	  ubiquitous	  for	  copyright	  related	  online	  practices	  –	  regime	  complexity	  
increases	  regulatory	  uncertainty.	  
In	  terms	  of	  regulatory	  practices,	  transnational	  legal	  networks	  of	  private	  and	  public	  actors	  such	  
as	  international	  arbitration	  courts	  (Lehmkuhl	  2003),	  intergovernmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  
organizations	  as	  well	  as	  national	  governments	  and	  transnational	  epistemic	  communities	  
(Dobusch	  and	  Quack	  2010),	  provide	  the	  interaction	  context	  for	  building	  and	  developing	  an	  
                                                
22 See the instructive blog by Ray Beckermann, which presents an extensive collection of related law suits entitled 
“Recording Industry vs The People”, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/ [March 29, 2011] 
23 While one of the reasons for directly targeting end-user may be their new and previously unknown technological 
potential to create and distribute content online, another explanation may also be difficulties in targeting 
intermediaries due to regulatory asymmetries between jurisdictions (see the subsequent section below). 
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understanding	  of	  transnational	  regulation.	  Transnational	  regulation	  is	  thereby	  shaped	  in	  cyclical	  
processes	  consisting	  of	  contractual	  innovation,	  legal	  standardization	  and	  legal	  normalization	  
(for	  details	  see	  Quack	  2007).	  
Especially	  the	  first	  of	  those	  regulatory	  practices,	  contractual	  innovation,	  is	  heavily	  tied	  to	  
transnational	  usage	  practices	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  engaging	  in	  legal	  arbitrage	  at	  the	  borders	  of	  
multiple	  jurisdictions	  –	  bending	  of	  existing	  law	  included	  (Carruthers	  and	  Halliday	  1998).	  
Samuelson	  (2004),	  for	  example,	  lists	  implementation	  differences	  with	  regard	  to	  copyright	  
protection	  for	  software24	  and	  for	  DVD	  region	  codes25	  as	  cases	  for	  potential	  legal	  arbitrage,	  
where	  high-­‐protection	  rules	  of	  one	  country	  (e.g.	  U.S.)	  may	  be	  undermined	  by	  lower-­‐protection	  
rules	  of	  other	  countries	  (e.g.	  EU).	  	  
Another	  example	  mentioned	  by	  Samuelson	  (2004:	  229f.),	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  (P2P)	  file	  sharing	  
technologies,	  is	  even	  more	  instructive.	  As	  described	  above,	  both	  end-­‐users	  and	  developers	  of	  
P2P	  software	  have	  regularly	  been	  subject	  of	  legal	  controversy	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  court.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  P2P	  software	  Grokster,	  courts	  in	  the	  U.S.26	  and	  in	  the	  Netherlands27	  made	  
contradictory	  rulings,	  leading	  Samuelson	  to	  conclude	  that	  
“[t]he	  principal	  result	  of	  national	  differences	  on	  indirect	  copyright	  liability	  rules	  may	  
be	  to	  shift	  development	  of	  P2P	  technologies	  offshore.	  The	  development	  and	  
distribution	  of	  P2P	  technologies	  will	  not	  stop	  unless	  they	  are	  banned	  in	  all	  
countries.”	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  difficulties	  in	  legally	  targeting	  new	  intermediaries	  such	  as	  the	  providers	  
of	  P2P	  technologies,	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  established	  industry	  actors	  as	  plaintiffs	  
increasingly	  persecute	  individual	  end-­‐users	  via	  litigation.	  While	  the	  providers	  of	  infringing	  
                                                
24 The example deals with software licensing terms prohibiting reverse engineering (see Samuelson 2004: 226f.). 
25 “Developers of computer games may try to enhance their profits by embedding country or region codes so that 
their games will play only on platforms embedded with the same code. This allows game-makers to sell the same 
product at different prices in different countries.” (Samuelson 2004: 228) 
26 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc v Grokster, Ltd, 259 F Supp 2d 1029,1043,1046 (CD Cal 2003) 
27 The decision by a Dutch appellate court ruled that developers of file-sharing software were not liable for 
copyright infringement, even if their users might be (Samuelson 2004: 230). 
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technologies	  are	  seemingly	  able	  to	  exploit	  legal	  arbitrage,	  end-­‐users	  often	  do	  not	  have	  the	  
capability	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  	  
But	  even	  if	  decisions	  in	  different	  countries	  are	  in	  line,	  implementation	  and	  enforcement	  need	  
not	  be.	  The	  reaction	  to	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  may	  therefore	  be	  not	  so	  much	  regulatory	  but	  
rather	  in	  form	  of	  adapted	  business	  models.	  In	  China,	  for	  example,	  difficulties	  in	  enforcing	  both	  
public	  and	  private	  regulation	  such	  as	  copy	  protection	  technologies	  (‘Digital	  Rights	  
Management’,	  DRM),	  has	  led	  major	  corporate	  actors	  such	  as	  Nokia	  to	  forgo	  such	  attempts	  all	  
together.	  Instead,	  the	  new	  business	  model	  seeks	  to	  compete	  with	  piracy	  by	  offering	  convenient	  
and	  low-­‐cost	  services	  without	  copy	  protection	  measures.28	  	  
Conclusions	  and	  Outlook	  
In	  his	  assessment	  of	  global	  ‘movie	  piracy’,	  Yar	  (2005:	  677)	  describes	  a	  “piracy	  epidemic”	  as	  
being	  “the	  product	  of	  shifting	  legal	  regimes,	  lobbying	  activities,	  rhetorical	  manoeuvres,	  criminal	  
justice	  agendas,	  and	  ‘interested’	  or	  ‘partial’	  processes	  of	  statistical	  inference”.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  
juxtaposes	  and	  contrasts	  his	  “social	  constructionist”	  perspective	  with	  a	  prevalent	  “realist”	  view,	  
which	  explains	  “the	  ‘rise	  of	  piracy’	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  range	  of	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  
technological	  changes.”	  In	  our	  paper,	  we	  attempt	  to	  go	  one	  step	  further.	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  debate	  
around	  piracy	  manufactured	  and	  therefore	  socially	  constructed	  but	  the	  demarcation	  between	  
legal	  and	  illegal	  –	  as	  a	  precondition	  for	  speaking	  about	  piracy	  in	  the	  first	  place	  –	  is	  so,	  as	  well.	  
Paradoxically,	  this	  re-­‐introduces	  a	  realist	  notion	  in	  a	  social	  constructionist	  perspective.	  In	  
transnational	  legal	  fields	  such	  as	  copyright	  regulation,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  authority	  with	  the	  
power	  to	  definitively	  decide	  whether	  certain	  practices	  are	  legal	  or	  illegal.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  not	  
only	  the	  weak	  but	  also	  the	  most	  potent	  actors	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  regulatory	  conversations	  
construing	  legality	  and	  illegality	  of	  internet	  usage	  practices.	  What	  is	  considered	  an	  illegal	  
practice	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Wu	  2010)	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  in	  the	  
future.	  	  
                                                
28 For details see http://governancexborders.com/2010/04/10/drm-in-the-music-industry-revival-or-retreat/ 
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In	  this	  context,	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  extended	  
copyright	  legislation	  and	  online	  copyright	  enforcement	  are	  using	  notions	  of	  legality	  and	  
illegality	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  strategically	  framing	  their	  aims	  and	  arguments	  in	  social	  struggles.	  
Part	  of	  these	  struggles	  are	  presentations	  of	  copyright	  issues	  as	  being	  “resolved”,	  certain	  usage	  
practices	  being	  definitely	  “illegal”	  or	  “legal”.	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  literature,	  however,	  reveals	  
that	  in	  many	  fields	  –	  even	  for	  legal	  practitioners	  –	  it	  is	  still	  very	  unclear	  and	  highly	  contested	  
what	  is	  legal	  and	  illegal.	  	  
While	  public	  discourse	  on	  internet	  piracy	  and	  consuming	  illegal	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  end-­‐users,	  
our	  analysis	  rather	  suggests	  that	  many	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  controversies	  about	  usage	  practices	  
are	  currently	  fought	  out	  around	  intermediaries.	  Many	  of	  these	  intermediaries	  are	  
experimenting	  with	  new	  business	  models	  and	  innovative	  technologies.	  While	  some	  of	  these	  
new	  platforms	  such	  as	  YouTube	  achieved	  great	  legitimacy	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  
(seemingly)	  infringing	  usage	  practices	  (Shenkman	  2008),	  others	  such	  as	  providers	  of	  P2P	  file	  
sharing	  technologies	  have	  failed	  in	  gaining	  similar	  legitimacy	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  substantial	  share	  of	  
non-­‐infringing	  usage	  practices.	  None	  of	  these	  business	  models	  or	  innovative	  technologies	  is	  or	  
has	  been	  by	  definition	  and	  ex	  ante	  “illegal”.	  Yet,	  notions	  of	  legality	  and	  illegality	  might	  be	  
strategically	  used	  by	  competitors	  from	  incumbent	  or	  “old”	  industries	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  prevent	  
new	  market	  entrants.	  	  
Lastly,	  our	  study	  of	  the	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  online	  usage	  practices	  sheds	  a	  
different	  light	  on	  so-­‐called	  “internet	  piracy”.	  How	  shall	  everyday	  internet	  users,	  mainly	  
concerned	  with	  their	  immediate	  goals	  of	  consuming,	  sharing	  or	  interacting	  with	  online	  contents	  
of	  all	  kinds,	  easily	  determine	  whether	  their	  practices	  are	  ‘legal’	  or	  ‘illegal’,	  when	  lawyers,	  
judges,	  and	  legislators	  in	  different	  national	  jurisdictions	  disagree	  on	  these	  issues	  and	  novel	  
technologies	  are	  escaping	  the	  scope	  of	  previously	  existing	  law	  anyway?	  So	  far	  we	  know	  only	  
very	  little	  about	  the	  perceptions	  and	  strategies	  of	  end-­‐users	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  legality	  of	  their	  
practices	  (see,	  for	  a	  notable	  exception,	  Bajde	  2010).	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  study	  how	  end-­‐
users	  perceive	  the	  legality	  of	  their	  practices,	  to	  which	  extent	  they	  justify	  their	  practices	  as	  “civil	  
opposition”	  to	  overwhelmingly	  powerful	  economic	  actors	  from	  the	  US	  media	  industry	  (Leung	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2006)	  or	  as	  justified	  ignorance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  incomprehensibly	  complex	  transnational	  law.	  It	  would	  
also	  be	  an	  interesting	  topic	  for	  further	  research	  to	  investigate	  to	  which	  degree	  campaigns	  of	  the	  
US	  media	  industry	  against	  piracy	  have	  contributed	  to	  a	  transnational	  collective	  identity	  in	  user	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